Available studies on asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism within Europe are invariably based on macro-economic evidence: such evidence is abundant but often contradictory. This paper takes a different route by using micro-economic data. We use the information contained in the balance sheets of individual banks (available from the BankScope database) to implement a case-study on the response of banks in France, Germany, Italy and Spain to a monetary tightening. The episode we study occurred during 1992, when monetary conditions were tightened throughout Europe. Evidence on such tightening is provided by the uniform squeeze in liquidity, which affected all banks in our sample. We study the first link in the transmission chain by analysing the response of bank loans to the monetary tightening. Our experiment provides evidence on the importance of the "credit" channel in Europe, and thus on one possibly important source of asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism. We do not find evidence of a significant response of bank loans to the monetary tightening, which occurred during 1992, in any of the four European countries we have considered. However, we find significant differences both across countries and across banks of different dimensions in the factors that allow them to shield the supply of loans from the squeeze in liquidity.
Introduction
This paper studies the monetary transmission mechanism in Europe, a topic that has attracted new attention following the start of the EMU. Asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism across the members of the monetary union could be a critical factor in determining the effects of the single monetary policy. Consider, as an example, an EMU-wide symmetric inflationary shock. The ECB would respond by raising short-term interest rates. If the consequences of the monetary contraction were different from one country to another--both in terms of the timing and the magnitude of the responses of the relevant real variables--the output cost of maintaining price stability could be quite unevenly distributed across EMU.
We consider a potentially important channel for such asymmetries, related to the response of bank lending to monetary policy. When looking, in Europe, for asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism, it is natural to start from banks. As it is well known, banks are at the center of financial intermediation in continental Europe. The share of bank loans in total debt liabilities of non-financial firms is 85 per cent in Germany, 80 in France, 95 in Italy and 77 in Spain-by contrast, in the U.S., this share is about 30 per cent.
In this paper we use balance sheet information from a sample of 651 banks from four EU states (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) to study how bank lending responded to an episode of monetary tightening. The episode we investigate occurred during 1992. As opposed to the four continental countries, British monetary policy was looser in 1992 than it had been in 1991: this is the reason why we excluded the UK from our sample of large EU states.
When the central bank tightens monetary policy by squeezing bank reserves, it can generate a corresponding reduction in the supply of bank loans. There are two ways in which a bank can prevent this from happening. It can change the composition of its liabilities by issuing instruments not subject to a reserve requirement (such as CD's or interbank loans); alternatively it can sell bonds. If this does not happen, and the supply of loans is reduced, the monetary contraction will affect the real economy, unless firms can substitute at no cost bonds and commercial paper for loans. This effect (known as the "credit channel", see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) works on the supply side and amplifies the more traditional "money channel"--i.e. the demand effect of a monetary contraction, which affects new marginal spending by modifying 3 borrowing conditions and by affecting asset prices, and thus the market value of wealth.
Our use of micro data to study the transmission of monetary policy from the central bank to banks is motivated by the well-known observation that macroeconomic time-series are ill-suited to identify a "credit" channel from a "money" channel: the money channel works through banks' liabilities, and the credit channel works through their assets, but assets and liabilities are tightly related by accounting identities, thus posing a difficult identification problem. For this reason the evidence proposed by macroeconomic studies which look at output and price fluctuations in response to shifts in the quantities of loans and deposits is rarely decisive (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992) . On the contrary, micro-economic data allow one to identify the presence of a credit channel by testing the specific empirical implication of the credit view: namely that the responses of banks (and firms) to a shift in monetary policy should differ depending on their characteristics. Small banks, for instance, find it more difficult to insulate their loans' portfolio from a squeeze in central bank liquidity because they typically cannot substitute CD's and interbank loans for deposits at no cost. Moreover, Kashyap and Stein (1997b) , and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) show that, in the case of the U.S., small banks are typically "weak" (that is their share of cash+securities+reserves over total assets is low) and are thus unable to use their liquid assets as a buffer.
So far, tests of the credit channel based on the importance of bank characteristics in determining the response of loans to a shift in monetary policy have been limited to U.S. data. Our paper is the first study of this kind concerning Europe.
The result of our analysis is a new twist in the study of asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism in Europe. In this area too, macroeconomic data, have been unable to detect significant asymmetries in the transmission mechanism 1 . Studies based on macroeconomic data typically look at the impact of a shift in interest rates on inflation and output country-by-country. Such evidence, however, is hardly decisive.
First, the standard errors are often large, so that one can seldom reject the hypothesis of symmetry even if the point estimates are very different across countries. Second, the estimates are not robust to the 'Lucas critique' since they are based on samples 1 See Gerlach and Smets 1995 , Ramaswamy and Sloek 1997 , Barran, Coudert and Mojon 1997 , Britton and Whitley 1997 , Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi 1998 , Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998 , Cecchetti 1999 4 from a pre-EMU monetary regime--and one of the main effects of EMU is precisely that of changing the way European monetary policy is conducted. More importantly, the macroeconomic evidence on asymmetries in monetary transmission is mute to the question of which are the sources of the observed asymmetries--thus providing no guidance for policymakers who wish to do something to reduce them.A first attempt at using micro data to document the asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism has been provided by Maclennan et al. (1998) who examine the European housing market.
A limit of this paper is that, by concentrating on banks, we can study just the first link in the chain of monetary policy transmission. An obvious extension would investigate the response of European firms to a similar monetary tightening (see, for example, Kashyap et al.,1993 for the US case). This will be the object of a separate paper.
The evidence reported in this paper also sheds light on the possibility that the ECB may run into a "liquidity trap". There is widespread concern, at the start of EMU, that the ECB may face a period of deflation, that is a situation in which monetary policy may become ineffective. In the traditional IS-LM framework the liquidity trap occurs when the LM curve is flat and monetary policy thus becomes powerless. If, however, monetary policy also works through a credit channel, then an expansion will shift the IS curve outward (more precisely, the CC, credit and commodities, curve in the notation of Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) via the effect of bank liquidity on the supply on loans, and thus on consumption and investment.
Finding that the credit channel is important inside EMU would thus be good news for the ECB, were it to face conditions of deflation.
2
The paper is organised as follows. We start explaining why we chose 1992 for our case study. We then describe our data, our econometric specification and our results, both with respect to the empirical relevance of the credit channel, and to the induced asymmetries in the transmission mechanism across the EMU. We started by considering data for banks in six European countries: two core EMU states (France and Germany), two peripheral EMU states (Spain and Italy), plus Sweden and the UK. As we shall explain later on, the final analysis was restricted to the four continental countries.
Our micro-data come from BankScope, a financial database covering 9,400 world banks.
3 The database contains financial information collected from the banks' annual reports and re-classified in a standard format in order to make them comparable across countries. directly. Moreover, wider monetary aggregates are contaminated by demand shocks.
In Figure 1 we give a very stylised representation of the market for bank reserves in Europe.
The demand schedule is determined by the behaviour of banks. It is negatively sloped: the demand for reserves depends on the quantity of bank deposits, which are negatively related to the opportunity cost of holding money. The supply schedule is piecewise: it includes two flat sections and a vertical one. The interest rates on the two standing facilities provide an upper and a lower bound to the overnight rate. Banks can deposit funds with the central banks at the deposit rate, i min , and borrow funds from the central bank at the marginal rate, i max . Therefore, the overnight rate cannot be lower than the deposit rate, nor can it be higher than the marginal lending rate: it fluctuates inside a corridor. The upward sloping segment of the supply schedule is vertical, consistently with a central bank that fixes the volume of bank reserves by using open market operations, independently of the overnight rate. central bank targets the level of bank reserves, exogenous monetary policy shocks will be reflected in movements in reserves (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998 Bernanke and Mihov 1997 , Clarida and Gertler 1996 . Dornbusch et al., 1998 As a proxy for policy rates we use three-month Euro-rates; real rates are built using the realised CPI inflation rate. 6 Our measure of monetary policy is affected by changes in the compulsory reserves coefficients. In practice we have only one occurence of such a modification: in France, where in 1992 the reserve coefficient on sight deposits was reduced from four per cent to one per cent. We have dealt with this case by considering the shift in reserves net of the effect of the change in the compulsory reserves regime. 7 We use constant exchange rates because current exchange rates would bias our measure of the change in monetary policy, being affected by the fluctuations of the U.S. dollar against all the European currencies which occurred during 1992.
8 different in that there is no evidence of a monetary tightening in 1992-in fact UK monetary policy was looser in 1992. Moreover, we have very few observations (15) for Sweden. For these reasons we limit our empirical analysis to the four continental European states, and we studythe effects of monetary policy during 1992 only. We thus do not exploit the panel dimension of the data set: rather, we concentrate on a crosssection for a single year.
We further selected our sample by excluding those banks whose lending activity was marginal (defined as banks featuring a loans-to-total assets ratio of less than 20 per cent at the end of 1991) and those likely to have been involved in a merger (defined as banks whose total assets increased by more than 50 per cent in the course of 1992). Table   2 
Identifying the "lending channel"
Since output gaps remain relatively flat between 1991 and 1992, we interpret the shift that we observe in the quantity of loans as a movement along an unchanged demand curve, driven by a shift in supply.
As discussed above, the main empirical prediction of the lending view is that the effects of monetary policy on banks depend on their characteristics, and are thus heterogeneous. We aim at capturing these cross-sectional differences by using two variables: the 'strength' and the 'size' of a bank's balance sheet.
Following Kashyap and Stein (1997b) we measure the strength of a balance sheet by the sum of three items, cash, securities and reserves, as a fraction of total 8 Based on the average number of branches per bank, Cerasi et al. (1998) conclude that BankScope is a good approximation of the German and French commercial banking systems, but it slightly overrepresents big banks for the other major European countries.
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assets. The idea is that a balance sheet is 'strong' when it is liquid, thus allowing a bank to insulate the supply of loans from fluctuations in monetary policy.
Banks of similar size might have balance sheets of different strength, thus inducing them to respond differently to monetary policy. Size, moreover, can capture elements of the lending view that are not related to the strength of the balance sheet:
larger banks might find it easier to issue a variety of market instruments (such as certificates of deposit) which also can shelter their lending from shifts in monetary policy.
We thus divide our sample in ten deciles. The deciles are constructed using the distribution of banks' total assets for all countries in our sample. Table 3 reports this distribution. By construction the total number of banks in each decile is constant at 65. In each cell of Table 3 As regards the relative 'strength' of the banks in our sample we observe (see Table 4 ) a rather homogeneous distribution within countries, with the only exception of the German banks belonging to the upper two deciles of the distribution-which are relatively "weaker" than smaller German banks. Across countries we note that banks in Italy and Spain are relatively stronger-possibly a consequence of the large stocks of public debt issued in these countries, and of the significant bank holdings of such debt.
To provide a first visual impression of the relevance of the lending channel we show, in We explore further this first evidence in the next section by implementing an econometric analysis of the responses of bank loans to monetary policy.
Econometric evidence
We estimate, separately for each country, the following equation: Overall we find no evidence for a lending channel of the transmission of monetary policy in the four EMU countries we study. The test for this hypothesis, namely of a zero response of loans to a change in reserves, (reported in Table 6 ) confirms the visual impression reported in Table 5 above: the null is never rejected.
From the viewpoint of understanding the possible role of the lending channel in determining asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism inside EMU one could stop here: asymmetries cannot be ascribed to a difference across countries in the response of bank loans to monetary policy-at least in the four countries we consider, and at least based on the evidence from our case study. This result, however, is obtained from the aggregation of banks of different size and strength: the way these two variables combine to produce the total impact on bank loans of a change in reserves differs interestingly both across banks of different size and strength, and across different countries.
We shall comment our results by country, starting from France. France is the only country where the aggregate result is confirmed decile-by-decile: neither the total impact, nor its components are significant, with the possible exception of the third decile which 
Conclusions
So far, the available empirical evidence on asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism across Europe was mostly limited to studies based on macroeconomic data.
This literature often suggests that the credit channel could be one important factor lying behind the observed asymmetries (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 1997b, 1997c.) Our The same percentage is 20 in the U.S., 19 in the U.K., 6 in Germany, 5 in Italy, 9 in Spain. The data 13 a strong sensitivity of the lending channel. The grades are as follows (as reported in Table   6 of Kashyiap and Stein, 1997a ) the first grade refers to the importance of small banks, the second to bank health): B-C for France, C-B for Germany, B-C for Italy and B-B for Spain. These rankings do not show significant asymmetries across countries-although our econometric results indicate a uniform A-grade for all countries. Interestingly, however, when they consider, along with the bank factors, two firm-related factors--the relative importance of small firms, and the availability, to firms, of non-bank finance--that is when they consider the second link in the lending channel chain, they come up with a ranking that is closer to ours, except for Italy: Italy C-, France B/C, Germany B, Spain B.
This evidence confirms the need to complement the findings in the present paper with an analysis of firms' response to a shift in the supply of bank loans. 586  591  596  601  606  611  616  621  626  631  636  641  646  651 
